Differentia: Review of Italian Thought
Number 8 Combined Issue 8-9 Spring/Autumn

Article 56

1999

Confronti con Heidegger a cura di Giuseppe Semerari
Bruno Gulli

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia

Recommended Citation
Gulli, Bruno (1999) "Confronti con Heidegger a cura di Giuseppe Semerari," Differentia: Review of Italian
Thought: Vol. 8 , Article 56.
Available at: https://commons.library.stonybrook.edu/differentia/vol8/iss1/56

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Academic Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Differentia: Review of Italian Thought by an authorized editor of Academic Commons. For more
information, please contact mona.ramonetti@stonybrook.edu, hu.wang.2@stonybrook.edu.

410

DIFFERENT/A

demic writing" (25). So much of what
academics refer to as the postmodern,
then, is caught up in this migration of
the terminologies and priorities of
criticism into other fields of study,
such as philosophy and historiography, and then back into literature.
The adoption of the rhetoric of fiction
by other disciplines brings to life
"otherwise
potentially
tedious
details" (23) that are their stock-intrade but effectively forestalls efforts
at gaining critical distance (23-24).
The change in vocabulary modifies
the academy's view of the world and
this in turn motivates the proposal
that the world has indeed changed
(3).

Simpson contends that the postmodern storyteller is quite different
from Benjamin's. The latter, by allowing the listener to participate in the
authenticity of shared experience,
gives counsel for the future. In the
"academic postmodernism" convincingly described by Simpson, the
"self-enthusiasm and self-projection"
(26) of the "autobiographical
moment" prevails. Storytelling is limited in scope to the writer's situatedness or historic specificity, a state of
affairs that dovetails nicely with the
postmodern
valorization
of local
knowledge and delegitimation of all
metanarratives. Legitimacy is gained
when writing about oneself, ostensibly the only thing the individual is
capable of knowing, and the particu"as effectively
lar is considered
imbued with the determining powers
of the social whole" (13).
JOSEPH FRANCESE
Michigan State University

Confronti con Heidegger
a cura di Giuseppe Semerari.
Bari: Edizioni Dedalo, 1992.

The volume edited by Semerari
presents a series of confrontations
with Heidegger-confrontations
which occur at two levels: 1) between
the philosophers
who have contributed
to the volume
and
Heidegger,
and
2) between
Heidegger and various philosophers
of the western tradition.
These confrontations set for themselves the task, and have the merit, of
deepening and widening our understanding of the thematic and problematic ramifications of Heidegger's
thinking throughout the history of
philosophy-a
ramification that for
Heidegger himself was never above
all and necessarily historical, except
for the fact that the history of
Western philosophy, as the history of
metaphysics, represented for him the
history of the concealment of the
truth of being.
Heidegger comes out of these confrontations as a philosopher modernity cannot dispense with, and yet as
one whose thinking needs to be critically examined and gone over again.
The volume starts with an essay
by Valerio Bernardi on the relationship between dialectical theology and
Heideggerian ontology . The essay
focusses on Bultmann's appropriation of certain Heideggerian themes
such as the historicity
of man as
Dasein and his potentiality-for-being
and resoluteness,
as well as the
theme of being-towards-death.
For
Bultmann,
Bernardi
says,
Heideggerian philosophy is not "a
philosophy, but the philosophy" (8);

reviews
it provides
the theologian with a
method that may enable him to
expound the evangelical message to
the contemporary world. The debate
on whether Heideggerian philosophy-or, for that matter, any "philosophy whose presuppositions
are
atheistic"
(32)-can
be a useful
method for theology follows directly
from Bultmann's position.
After considering the criticism of
Heim, Lowith, and Brunner, Bernardi
concludes by stating the difficulty of
establishing a relationship between a
theology based on Revelation and an
atheistic philosophy; moreover, he
says that Heidegger's
view of the
matter was that of a subordination of
theology to philosophy. As Bernardi
says, "[s]uch a relationship, in which
philosophy becomes the basis and
the presupposition
for theological
work, is problematic for a theology
that, like dialectic theology, has
always sought autonomy" (32).
The second essay, on Heidegger
and Plotinus by Ferruccio De Natale
is not an attempt at tracing any kind
of relationship
between the two
thinkers, but to show that a relationship
is in fact
impossible.
Accordingly, the essay itself-wellwritten and well-researched-is
like
a little jewel that leaves one with the
same impression a little jewel gives: it
is beautiful; but it is difficult to say
more about it. Perhaps the most interesting point is when De Natale discusses the concept of destiny in the
two thinkers. There is, however, little
wonder that, at the end of his essay,
De Natale asks: "Was then our journey a useless one?" (his italics). And
his answer, "Yes, especially if we
wanted to 'show' or 'explain' or
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'prove' anything, but what we wanted to do was trace consonances
between two equally great and different thinkers" (65). And these consonances, as his title says, are imperfect.
The essay by Francesco Valerio
(seventh and last in the collection) on
Heidegger and Spinoza is not a jewel
but a brick-better,
a whole solid
structure. Valerio's is indeed a very
useful reflection on today's philosophical dis/ orientation and the need
for a re-orientation. Valerio starts by
pointing out Heidegger's historical
silence on Spinoza. For Valerio,
Heidegger's
harsh judgment
of
Spinoza's work-that
Spinoza used
concepts of medieval Scholasticism
and of other philosophers who preceded him, notably Giordano Bruno,
in a rarely acritical way-was enough
to determine his "historical sense"
(Valerio puts this phrase in scare
quotes) in such a way as to "declare
Spinoza's position as theoretically
irrelevant within that dynamic of the
destiny of Being as embodied in
modern metaphysics" (213).
Valerio' s essay is thematically connected to the fourth essay in the volume, by Michele Illiceto, on the relationship between the 'self' and the
'is' in Heidegger's
ontology. The
philosopher with whom Heidegger is
here having a confrontation
is
Husserl, concerning the Cartesian

cogito.

·

In Heidegger's
reading
of
Descartes, Illiceto says, man enters
the scene with the cogito;indeed, "he
posits himself as the scene" (121). By
way of overturning the sense of the
Cartesian cogito,Heidegger establishes Being as the scene so that the 'is'
becomes the place of a-letheia in
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which "man appears" (125). For
Husserl, Illiceto continues, the 'is'
opens up in and through the movement of the Ego; the ' self' finds
itself-as its 'beyond' -in this movement and place. For Heidegger, on
the other hand, the 'beyond' has the
configuration of the 'already': it is
"the space of the 'is' understood as
phusis" (125). What Husserl and
Heidegger share is Husserl's dictum
to go 'towards the things themselves'; that is, as Illiceto explains, not
to the things as such, but to their selfsameness. However, the y diverge in
their understanding and employment
of the uber: "in Heidegger , transcendence indicates the 'beyond' that, in
the 'There,' is the sphere in which we
are 'already' thrown and in which we
are in the manner of having-beenthrown. In Husserl, instead, it indicates the way to the constitution,
through reduction, of the Ego" (130).
For this reason, Heidegger's ontology
becomes an ontology of impossibility.
Illiceto's
conclusion
is that
Heidegger leaves us with two fundamental impossibilities: the first is that
man has no access to temporality; the
second, that he is condemned to the
absence of himself. In this sense,
Illiceto proposes a move away "from
a relation [between the 'is' and the
'self'] founded on transcendence to a
relation founded on intentionality"
(139; brackets mine). A return to
Husserl? Not quite so. Illiceto ends
his essay by referring to E. Bloch's
'ontology of possibility' -one which
Heidegger, in establishing a 'possibility of ontology,' has indeed not provided. He reassumes Heidegger's
ontology as follows: "man configures
himself as a possibility that is funda-

mentally unable to be the possibility
he is" (140).
The essay of Domenica Discipio,
third in the volume, is on Heidegger
and Freud. As in the case with
Plotinus and Spinoza, Heidegger's
relation to Freud is not direct or
explicit. Perhaps, a reason for this can
be found, Discipio suggests, in
Heidegger's declaration, in Being and
Time, of "the need to operate a critique of traditional thinking that, in
its historical forms, has covered and
concealed the essential historicity of
Dasein and of its Being" (70).
To draw a confrontation between
Heidegger and Freud, Discipio starts
with a discussion of Heidegger's
Zollikoner Seminiire (1969) on the
meaning of the word consciousness
(Bewufltsein),where, for the first time,
Heidegger "evokes" Freud, "so accurately ignored in his whole philosophical reflection" (69). Discipio
goes through M. Bartels's and W. J.
Richardson's works on the connections between Heidegger ' s thinking
and Freud's psychoanalytic theory.
Both authors ask the question as to
whether it is possible to apply
Heidegger ' s onto-existential analysis
to Freud's theory of human personality. However, by way of overturning
these questions, Discipio is interested
in whether it is possible to use psychoanalysis
for a rethinking
of
Heidegger's thought in an attempt to
understand why Heidegger might
have wanted to focus "constantly,"
and "only and always" (95), on the
Being of Dasein.
After recalling
Heidegger's
emphasis on the primacy of ontology
(here Discipio reminds us of the most
fundamental metaphysical question:

reviews
Why is there anything rather than
nothing?), she goes through a series
of similar themes in Heidegger and
Freud, of which the most important is
the theme of the Es as what "gives
existence to man" in Freud, and as
the Es of the Es gibt in Heidegger. For
the latter, Discipio explains, "the
being of man is concealed in the
depths of the Es" (97). Inasmuch as
the Es gibt Sein constitutes a destiny-for it makes man what he isthinking moves from the Es to the
gibt, to the giving itself as an "act of
love" not different from the libido of
the Es in Freud, that is, Eros.
Consequently, Discipio speaks of
Eros and Thanatos as the two fundamental principles of Freud's theory,
and Thanatos is to be found in
Heidegger's Being-towards-death.
However, Discipio also says that,
notwithstanding
their similarities,
there is in Freud, particularly in relation to the death instinct, a departure
from a possible
analogy with
Heidegger.
Mauro G. Minervini's essay on
Heidegger and Hegel (fourth essay in
the volume) is an analysis
of
Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology as phenomena-logy, that
is, literally, as logic in the Hegelian
sense-a
sense that, according to
Heidegger, Hegel receives directly
from Aristotle. The essay also contains a good discus sion of certain
central themes in Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason, necessar y to an understanding of Heidegger's interpretation of Hegel's concept of time as
"constitutive of logical labor" (161).
Finally, Giuseppe Semerari' s essay
deals with the relationship between
Heidegger and Parmenides
and,
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essentially, with the question of man
as being (entity). Semerari starts by
clearing the way from the two current and opposite interpretations of
Heidegger's
thinking
as either
humanistic (with an emphasis on
anthropocentrism) or anti-humanistic
(with an emphasis on the death of
man). Then he draws an important
distinction between two possible
philosophical models to approach the
question of man and his cosmic disposition: either a Parmenidean or a
Protagorean
model. The former
grounds itself on the fundamental
undecidability of man's destiny by
man himself; the latter, on the idea of
self-responsibility
which follows
from Protagoras's discovery that man
is 'the measure of all things ' (168-69).
Obviously, Heidegger works with
and within the Parmenidean model.
From here, Semerari moves to the
concept of man's "facticity" and to
the hermeneutics of facticity-that is,
Semerari says quoting Gadamer's
"felicitous definition", which I paraphrasethe fact that man cannot
conceptualize his existence. Semerari
identifies Heidegger's Parmenidism
in the fact that, in Heidegger, man
himself is not freedom but "the place
in which freedom liberates itself"
(180), for freedom is Being. Unlike
the
Protagorean
model,
in
Parmenides, it is not "man who has
___,but _ has man as its determination, as its There (Da)..." (181). Man is
a project, but the project is tautological-here
one finds a relation
between Semerari's and Illiceto's
essays-for it is the "choice of what
man already is by virtue of his beingthrown in the way in which he has
been thrown" (182).
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Semerari's essay-but this is true
of all the others-is
mainly concerned with the issue of freedom and
destiny, and thus with what today, in
the era of technology and danger theorized by Heidegger, still can and
must be thought. By way of confronting Heidegger on the ground of
his confrontations with other thinkers
of the Western tradition, the whole
volume becomes an important source
of critical orientations for the future
of thinking, as well as a serious
reflection on themes whose problematics have not yet been exhausted.
BRUNO GULLI
CUNY Graduate Center, New York

II gioco dei limiti. L'idea di
esistenza in Nietzsche.
Furio Semerari.
Bari: Laterza, 1993. 224 pp.

For the past forty years, Nietzsche
has been a major interlocutor in contemporary Italian critical thought. He
been subjected, in nearly chronological succession, to compelling interpretations by existentialists, structuralists, Marxists, thinkers of the
negative and of difference,
and
hermeneuticians . Some readings, in
particular, have become witness to
, and icons of specific intellectual-cultural moods, and here we can briefly
recall the influential monographs by
Gianni Vattimo, Antonio Penzo,
Giangiorgio Pasqualotto, Giuseppe
Masini, Massimo Cacciari, Giorgio
Colli. In each case, Nietzsche's peculiar textuality was made to support

the thesis that his Overman was a
model for liberation and emancipation, or that he was systematically
misrepresented for the early part of
the century, especially in Germany.
On another front, Nietzsche's notion
of difference manifested significantly
disparate traits to the Italians than it
did to the French; thus he was read as
the ultimate hermeneutician of endless interpretation or, on yet another
reading, as the last expression of an
utterly fragmented subject(ivity) of
metaphysical thought, the announcer
of achieved nihilism. Of course,
artists and writers also have dug
inside the endlessly configurable
Nachlass, especially in the seventies
and through the eighties. One aspect
which recurs often is the elusive rapport between body and meaning, life
and art, the dynamic of the creative
impulse, life itself as constantly
changing positions; "gaming", as we
might say with Lyotard.
Fulvio Semerari' s book intends to
re-read the Colli-Montinari corpus in
terms of a problematic concept which
is perhaps not sufficiently thematized
by Nietzsche himself, at least explicitly, but which can serve as the background web or linkage among a constellation of other assertions and
divagations only apparently contradictory or unrelated. This is the concept of limit , which according to
Semerari takes on several meanings
and on the basis of which we can further penetrate and pay homage to the
thinker who refuses to be, who cannot be, categorized, and seems destined to spur and produce ever-different interpretations . Beginning with
observation
that
Karl Lowith's
Nietzsche's "travailled thinking is

